Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate Transactions: What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, . . . Should Know by Moss, Jeffrey M.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 9
5-1-1992
Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate Transactions:
What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, . . .
Should Know
Jeffrey M. Moss
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey M. Moss, Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate Transactions: What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, . . . Should Know, 6 BYU J.
Pub. L. 365 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol6/iss2/9
Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate 
Transactions: What Every Owner, Operator, 
Buyer, Lender, ... Should Know 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental liability issues affect every real estate 
transaction, whether it be the financing and purchase of a 
multimillion dollar industrial facility, a piece of farm land, or 
even residential property. 1 These issues 
are deeply serious, for they involve at their heart our relation 
to the powerful technologies upon which our society increas-
ingly has come to rely. Yet the effects of these developing 
legal rules are also severe: they threaten to disrupt and even 
reorder established investments, longstanding methods of 
doing business, and preexisting expectations about legal 
rights and responsibilities. 2 
Indeed, "[n]o field of liability involves more far reaching statu-
tory civil liabilities than those imposed by the Federal 
Superfund and similar state regimes."3 Many of the players in 
real estate transactions, including buyers, sellers, lenders, and 
successor and parent corporations, regardless of their degree of 
care, risk exposure to millions of dollars in potential liability 
for hazardous wastes which may be hidden on, or which may 
later be disposed of on a parcel of property. Although few dis-
agree that the environmental threat which these hazardous 
waste sites impose justifies drastic measures, many argue that 
liability under CERCLA is misplaced4 and that its dramatic 
1. Marion Gerhardt, Lender Liability For "Toxic Blackacre", 54 KY. BENCH & 
B. 16 (1990); Martin R. Ufford, Avoiding the Spectre of Environmental Liability: 
Recommendations for Financtal Institutions and Trust Companies, 59 J. KAN. B. 
Ass'N 15 (1990); Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund 
and Related laws on Real Estate Transaction, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst) 
10,017 (1984). 
2. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 956 (1988). 
3. Id. at 942. 
4. Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that the court in United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), "ignored commercial 
realities and left some disturbing questions" in holding a secured lender which had 
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impact on real estate transactions and the economy is unjusti-
fied,5 and even counterproductive.6 
This paper discusses CERCLA's impact on real estate 
transactions and what, at a minimum, every player in any real 
estate transaction should know in order to prevent or limit 
CERCLA liability. It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze 
every issue raised in great detail; its scope is far too broad for 
such in depth coverage. Rather, it is intended to provide an 
overview of the potential CERCLA liability of the major players 
in a real estate transaction, focusing on the most controversial 
current issues. 7 Part II of this paper briefly surveys CERCLA's 
statutory scheme. Part III focuses on the various players in any 
real estate transaction who risk exposure to millions of dollars 
in Superfund liability, regardless of their degree of care and 
foreclosed on property contaminated by hazardous wastes liable for $500,000 in 
cleanup costs incurred by the EPA); Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: 
Are there any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 432 (1988). Glass 
argues that 
I d. 
[t)he scope of CERCLA liability needs to be narrowed so that it is more 
predictable. Investors and businessmen need to know the true potential of 
their liability under the Act. Current trends are resulting in the alien-
ation of lands and businesses which might have contained hazardous 
waste sites at one time rather than deterring the abandonment of such 
sites. As this indicates, the Emphasis of CERCLA is severely misplaced. 
5. Glass, supra note 4, at 431-32 ("businessmen are becoming increasingly 
reluctant to invest in businesses which might generate, transport, or store haz-
ardous waste, and are finding that the possible CERCLA liability often outweighs 
the investment opportunity in a potentially profitable company") (citation omitted). 
Glass points out that "enforcement of CERCLA has deleteriously affected real 
estate and commercial transactions," id. at 386, and that "the current state of the 
law is grossly unfair .... " Id. at 394. See also Abraham, supra note 2, at 944 
(new environmental liability and lack of insurance for it "is bound to discourage 
productive enterprise"); Steven B. Bass, Comment, The Impact of the 1986 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending 
Industry: A Critical Assessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 899-901 (1987) (pointing 
out that imposition of Superfund liability on banking industry forces interest rates 
to rise, thus stunting economic growth). 
6. Glass, supra note 4, at 386 ("The Act has created as many problems as it 
has resolved"). See also id. at 432. CERCLA can be referred to as an "environmen-
tal black hole" since it generally promotes the abandonment, rather than the 
cleanup of waste sites. For example, CERCLA encourages lenders, rather than to 
foreclose and purchase the property through a sheriffs sale and expose themselves 
to potential liability far exceeding the value of the underlying security interest, to 
simply write the loans off and not touch the property; furthermore, property taxes 
will most likely not be paid on property marked with CERCLA liability-no one 
wants the property so eventually it will merely escheat back to the state. 
7. For example, lender liability and the security interest exemption of 
CERCLA section 101(20)(A). 
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often regardless of their degree of comparative fault. Part III 
also analyzes the limited defenses available to these respective 
players as well as other ways in which liability may be limited. 
Part IV concludes that until Congress acts to more fairly and 
justifiably allocate responsibility for hazardous waste disposal 
liability, or until courts limit their extremely expansive and 
liberal interpretation of CERCLA, every player in any real 
estate transaction must be acutely aware of its potential liabili-
ty and of how this liability may be limited. 
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
A. History and Policy of CERCLA 
CERCLA is a hastily drafted "eleventh hour compromise"8 
which, as one judge has said, is "marred by vague terminology 
and deleted provisions."9 Other judges concur that "'CERCLA 
has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted 
provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative 
history."'10 Despite its vague provisions and indefinite legisla-
tive history, however, the courts' liberal interpretation11 of 
CERCLA has led to one fairly uniform rule: the EPA usually 
gets its way. 
CERCLA is designed for the dual purpose of "allow[ing] the 
federal government to respond effectively to 'problems of na-
8. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985). See also 
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that "lilt is not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly debated 
piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many important issues, including 
corporate successor liability"); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, 
Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) (CERCLA was "enacted in the waning 
hours of the 96th Congress, and as the product of apparent legislative compromise 
is not the model of clarity"); Glass, supra note 4, at 389 ("[t]he senators were 
determined to pass legislation in response to the tragedy at Love Canal before the 
session ended. Therefore, ... the actual Bill which became law has virtually no 
recorded legislative history. Cuts, changes, and adaptations were made without 
reference or explanation"). 
9. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 
823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). 
10. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 
(1st Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 
1985)). 
11. ld. at 1081 (because CERCLA is a remedial statute designed to "protect 
and preserve public health and the environment [a court is] obligated to construe 
its provisions liberally") (citing Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902; United States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D.C. Mo. 1985)); United States v. 
Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Utah 1987). 
368 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
tional magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal' and 
to assure that those who profit from hazardous activities 'bear 
the cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful condi-
tions they created."'12 Through its statutory scheme "the gov-
ernment generally undertakes pollution abatement and pollut-
ers pay for such abatement through tax and reimbursement 
liability."13 However, as is discussed below, it is often more 
than the actual "polluters" who pay. 
B. Statutory Structure 
1. Who May Be Liable? 
CERCLA's liability section14 establishes four classes of 
potentially responsible parties: 
(1) current owners or operators of hazardous waste sites; (2) 
those persons who owned or operated the site at the time of 
disposal; (3) hazardous waste generators who arranged for 
disposal or treatment of their waste at the site; and (4) trans-
porters of the hazardous waste to a site from which there is a 
release or threatened release. 15 
The term "owner or operator" "does not include a person, who, 
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, 
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security 
interest in the vessel or facility."16 This is commonly referred 
12. Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1495 (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & 
Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). See also Cumberland 
Farms, 805 F.2d at 1081; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (D. Pa. 
1983) ("the Act is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste 
dump sites and when possible to place the ultimate financial burden upon those 
responsible for the . danger created by such sites"). 
13. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation 
omitted). See also United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 
1990) (noting that "[t]he essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place the 
ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on 'those responsible for 
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison'") (citing Florida Power & Light 
Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316; United States v. Aceto Ag. 
Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
14. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA) § 107(a), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
15. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manuf. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing CERCLA § 107(a)). However, "response costs or damages 
resulting from the application of a pesticide product registered under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act" are not recoverable under CERCLA. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(i) (1988). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
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to as the security interest exemptionY 
2. Extent of Liability and Who May Sue 
The parties enumerated in CERCLA section 107(a) are 
"potentially liable for the costs incurred as a result of 'a re-
lease, or a threatened release . . . of a hazardous substance' 
from the facility."18 The federal (or state) government may 
either use Superfund funds 19 to finance the cleanup of a haz-
ardous waste facility and then bring an action against these 
parties to recover the cost, 20 or the EPA may require these 
parties to remove hazardous substances which present an im-
minent and substantial danger to public health or welfare or 
the environment from the facility.21 CERCLA not only allows 
the government to bring suit, but "section 107(a)(l-4)(B) makes 
responsible parties liable to private persons for response costs" 
consistent with the national contingency plan. 22 A 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 75-150. 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). These costs include costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred by the federal or state government, other necessary response costs 
incurred by a party other than the government "consistent with the national 
contingency plan," natural resource damages, and the costs of a health assessment. 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A-D) (1988). Note that although it is an unspoken EPA 
policy to use CERCLA only against owners or operators of abandoned sites and 
RCRA against owners or operators of nonabandoned sites, CERCLA liability may 
be imposed on owners or operators of nonabandoned sites. Idaho v. Bunker Hill 
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986). 
19. When it was created in 1980, Superfund was 
funded primarily from excise taxes levied on the petroleum and chemical 
industries. Congress levied those taxes, essentially pollution excise taxes, 
specifically on those two industries because it believed there was a rea-
sonable nexus between their activities and the production of hazardous 
substances. Predominantly following the "polluter pays" principle, Congress 
fashioned the Superfund so that parties responsible for producing hazard-
ous substances bore the brunt of the removal and cleanup costs. 
In 1986, however, Congress decided that to fmance the substantial 
increase in the Superfund, it would broaden the Superfund tax base be-
yond merely the chemical and petroleum industries. Such a change in 
policy reflected the Senate Finance Committee's view that "the clean-up of 
abandoned hazardous waste sites is a broad societal problems extending 
beyond the chemical and petroleum industries." Consequently, SARA drew 
on other sources to replenish the Superfund with $8.5 billion over five 
years. The Superfund is currently subsidized as follows: 30% from a tax 
on petroleum, 30% from a tax on raw chemicals, 15% from general reve-
nues, 3.5% from interest, and 3.5% from government recoveries of cleanup 
costs from responsible parties. 
Bass, supra note 5, at 903-04. 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
22. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 
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governmentally authorized cleanup is not a precondition to a 
private cause of action under CERCLA23 so long as the private 
party is acting consistent with the national contingency 
plan.24 
3. Retroactive Strict Liability 
Not only are responsible parties strictly liable25 for the 
costs incurred as a result of a release or threatened release, but 
this liability is retroactive, meaning that liability is imposed 
"for the consequences of actions that were not subject to strict 
liability at the time they were taken."26 Thus, "[t]his liability 
attaches regardless of the time when the material was deposit-
ed and regardless of the absence of fault by the party held 
liable."27 
4. Joint and Several Liability and Apportionment 
Although "CERCLA does not mandate the imposition of 
joint and several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible 
harm."28 The policy for imposing joint and several liability in 
light of CERCLA's primary goal of expeditiously cleaning up 
hazardous waste sites is persuasive. 
It enables a plaintiff to select one primarily responsible party 
as the defendant, determine liability as to that defendant, 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1-4)(B) (1988)). 
23. ld. at 890-91. 
24. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041-42 (2d Cir. 1985) (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988), which holds a potentially responsible person 
liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan"). However, Superfund funds must be 
focused only on those sites on the National Priorities List. ld. at 1047. 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988); 
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (E.D.N.C. 1989); 
United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 839 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Versatile 
Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988); The 
Monsanto Court noted: "In addition to the unanimous judicial viewpoint that Con-
gress intended CERCLA liability to be strict, we observe that CERCLA section 
101(32) provides that the standard of liability applicable to CERCLA actions shall 
be that which governs actions under section 311 of the Clean Water Act," which 
courts have held to be strict. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167 n.ll. See also Shore 
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042. 
26. Abraham, supra note 2, at 957. 
27. ld. (citations omitted). See also Glass, supra note 4, at 393 & n.76. 
28. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.13; 
United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
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and collect the total amount of the damages from that one 
defendant. If a plaintiff were required to sue all potentially 
responsible parties . . . in order to ensure a comprehensive 
cleanup, delays inherent in such massive lawsuits would 
surely delay cleanup ofthe site. 29 
Thus, joint and several liability will be imposed unless the 
defendant establishes a "reasonable basis for apportioning 
liability among responsible parties."30 Litigation on the appor-
tionment issue indicates that most defendants will have a very 
difficult time establishing a reasonable basis upon which to 
apportion liability.31 In most cases, the defendant must es-
tablish more than just the volume of hazardous substance 
which she deposited at the site.32 Courts may require that the 
defendant show how much of that deposited volume was re-
leased into the environment, how the amount released inter-
acted with other released substances, and how these commin-
gled substances contributed to the harm. 33 Other factors 
29. Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D.C. Colo. 1985); See 
also Glass, supra note 4, at 438-39. 
30. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173 (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965)). See also United States v. R.W. 
Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 
183 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 422 (D.N.J. 1991); 
United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 842 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Versatile 
Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572-74 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Idaho v. 
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Idaho 1986); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 
608 F. Supp. 1484, 1489-90 (D.C. Colo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 
1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
31. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172-73 & n.27 (where defendants argued that 
"liability should have been apportioned according to the volume they deposited as 
compared to the total volume disposed of there by all parties" the court held that 
mere volumetric measures of amounts of hazardous wastes deposited "provide a 
reasonable basis for apportioning liability only if it can be reasonably assumed, or 
it has been demonstrated, that independent factors had no substantial effect on the 
harm to the environment"). The Monsanto court could find no reasonable basis for 
apportioning liability since the defendants "presented no evidence . . . showing a 
relationship between waste volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the 
harm at the site. Further, in light of the commingling of hazardous substances, the 
district court could not have reasonably apportioned liability without some evidence 
disclosing the individual and interactive qualities of the substances deposited 
there." !d. Thus, where numerous types of wastes have been disposed of at the 
site, in order for a court to apportion the liability, the defendant must not only 
establish the volume of hazardous waste which she contributed, but also must 
show the relationship between that volume, the actual release of hazardous sub-
stances, and the harm, taking into consideration the interactive and individual 
characteristics of the wastes deposited. 
32. !d.; see also Kramer, 757 !''. Supp at 422; Marisol, 725 F. Supp. at 842. 
33. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172. As the Monsanto court noted, "Common sense 
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which may be relevant to a defendant's apportion argument 
include "relative toxicity, migratory potential, and synergistic 
capacity of the hazardous substances at the site,"34 and the 
relationship of the response action taken to the defendant's 
particular waste.35 It is important to note, however, that al-
though joint and several liability will most often be imposed on 
defendants since courts are reluctant to find that a reasonable 
basis exists to apportion liability, "defendants still have a right 
to sue responsible parties for contribution, and in that action 
they may assert both legal and equitable theories of cost alloca-
tion."36 This right, however, is only valuable to the extent that 
other potentially responsible parties still exist and are viable. 
5. Requisites for CERCLA Cause of Action 
A prima facie case under CERCLA section 107(a) is estab-
lished if the plaintiff shows 1) that the site is a "facility,"37 2) 
that a "release" or threatened release of a ''hazardous sub-
stance" from the facility has occurred,38 3) that the plaintiff 
counsels that a million gallons of certain substances could be mixed together 
without significant consequences, whereas a few pints of others improperly mixed 
could result in disastrous consequences." ld. 
34. ld. at 172 n.26. 
35. United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 842 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (de-
fendants in CERCLA action seeking to avoid joint and several liability sufficiently 
alleged divisibility of harm, considering "percentage of total volume of materials 
disposed of at the site, the nature and relative toxicity of the materials, ... the 
relative contributions of the other defendants" and the fact that "the response 
actions taken by the government were unrelated to the defendant's particular 
waste .... " ld. 
36. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 173 (citing CERCLA section 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 
9613(f) (1988)). See also Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D.C. 
Colo. 1985) (citing cases). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) defmes "facility" as 
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (in-
cluding any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, 
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor 
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft or (B) any site or area where a hazard-
ous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or other-
wise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in 
consumer use or any vessel. 
The term facility has, not surprisingly, been given a very broad meaning by courts. 
In New York u. General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), the court 
held that a race strip on which used oil had been disposed of in order to keep the 
dust down was a facility under section 101(9) According to the court, 101(9) was 
not "designed to cover only traditional dump sites. That section expressly cov-
ers ... any area where hazardous substances come to be located." ld. at 296 (em-
phasis in original). 
38. "Release" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) as any spilling, leaking, 
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has incurred "response costs"39 as a result of the release or 
threatened release, and that the defendant is an "owner or 
operator"40 of a facility.41 As to causation, the plaintiff must 
merely show, "by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant's hazardous waste was deposited at the site and that 
the substances contained in the defendants' waste were also 
found at the site. "42 
6. Defenses 
CERCLA section 107(a) establishes that CERCLA liability 
is "subject only to those defenses set forth in subsection (b) of 
this section."43 Subsection (b) provides that an otherwise lia-
ble person may not be liable if he can "establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence" that the release or threatened release 
was 
caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war (3) an act 
or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent 
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in 
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or 
indirectly, with the defendant ... , if the defendant establish-
es by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised 
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, 
taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazard-
ous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, 
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, 
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discard-
ing of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous 
substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . . 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988) defmes "response" to mean "remove, removal, 
remedy, and remedial action" and "enforcement activities related thereto." 
40. Circularly defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988) to mean "any person 
owning or operating" a vessel or facility. However, "[s]uch term does not include a 
person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds 
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest." !d. 
41. See United States v. Serafmi, 706 F. Supp. 346, 349 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (citing 
United States v. Maryland, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)). 
42. United States v. Marisol, 725 F. Supp. 833, 840 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (citing 
Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1292 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Wade, 577 
F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983)). See also United States v. Monsanto, 858 
F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that causal nexus was established "by proof 
that hazardous substances 'like' those contained in the generator defendants' waste 
were found at the site . . . . Absent proof that a generator defendant's specific 
waste remained at a facility at the time of release, a showing of chemical similari-
ty between hazardous substances is sufficient"). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). A few defenses, however, such as the security 
interest exemption, exist outside of CERCLA § 107(b). 
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and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis-
sions of any such third party and the consequences that could 
forseeably result from such acts or omissions .... 44 
In 1986, Congress enacted the SARA amendments which 
added another defense known as the "innocent landowner de-
fense." This defense is a subset of the third party defense of 
section 107(b); it limits the term "contractual relationship" in 
that section to exclude defendants who can establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that "[a]t the time the defendant 
acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no 
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the 
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, 
in, or at the facility."45 "To establish that the defendant had 
no reason to know, ... the defendant must have undertaken, at 
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previ-
ous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good 
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize lia-
bility" considering factors such as "any specialized knowledge 
or experience" of the defendant, "the relationship of the pur-
chase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, 
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information 
about the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely 
presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to 
detect such contamination by appropriate inspection."46 A 
more detailed discussion of these defenses is presented be-
low.47 
Finally, the security interest exemption provides that a 
secured creditor "who, without participating in the manage-
ment of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily 
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility" is not 
an "owner and operator" and is thus not subject to CERCLA 
liability.48 The availability of this exemption to secured credi-
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Both the "act of God" and "act 
of war" defenses are rarely successful. The only time successful "act of God" de-
fenses have been raised are to the releases which occurred in the aftermath of the 
recent San Francisco earthquake. The third party defense is rarely available since 
it requires that the defendant have no contractual relationship with the third 
party. 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(B) (1988) (emphasis added). This section has spawned a 
multimillion dollar environmental assessment industry. 
47. See infra text accompanying notes 168-179. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988). 
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tors has been significantly eroded by the courts. This exemp-
tion is discussed in depth below.49 
Upon an examination of the cases, one must question the 
applicability of any of these defenses. Rarely do defendants 
successfully raise them. "[T]he courts' virtual adoption of the 
EPA's enforcement policies has caused many parties to wonder 
if a potentially responsible party ... may successfully raise any 
defenses against a CERCLA claim."50 
III. REAL ESTATE PLAYERS 
WHO MAY HAVE CERCLA LIABILITY 
The courts' expansive and liberal definition of "owner or 
operator" has resulted in the imposition of CERCLA liability on 
a wide variety of parties involved in real estate transactions 
including buyers (current owners), sellers (past owners), lend-
ers, corporate officers, employees, and majority shareholders, 
lessors, successor corporations, parent corporations, and trust-
ees. 
A. Current Owners or Operators 
CERCLA section 107(a)(l) makes the "owner or operator of 
a vessel or facility" at the time of cleanup51 liable for costs 
associated with the cleanup of a release or threatened release 
of a hazardous substance. CERCLA does not provide a helpful 
definition for the term "owner or operator"52 so courts have 
been left to define this critical term for themselves; consequent-
49. See infra text accompanying notes 75-150. 
50. Glass, supra note 4, at 386. See also Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (scope of liability under 
CERCLA is "extremely broad" and available defenses are "extremely limited"). 
51. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. lnst) 20994, 
20995 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Martin S. Baker, The Dangers of Hazardous Waste in Real 
Property Transactions, 12 ALI-ABA COURSE MAT. J. 109 (1988). 
52. CERCLA § 101(20)(A) defines "owner or operator" as "any person" "owning 
or operating" a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). "Person" is defined in 
subsection 21 as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, munici-
pality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988). The term "person" has also been given a liberal inter-
pretation by the courts. In United States u. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492 
(D. Utah 1987), the court held that even a dissolved corporation whose assets had 
not yet been fully distributed was a "person" liable under CERCLA section 
107(a)(2); thus, CERCLA preempted state corporation law regarding the capacity of 
a dissolved corporation to be sued. 
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ly, its meaning is still evolving. 
A current owner is strictly, jointly, and severally liable 
regardless of whether he owned the facility at the time of dis-
posal. 53 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,54 the Second Cir-
cuit rejected Shore's argument that it, as a current owner of 
the facility who did not own it at the time the waste was dis-
posed of, should not be held liable. Shore argued that only 
current operators who owned the property at the time of dis-
posal should be held liable.55 In rejecting this argument, the 
court pointed out that "if the current owner of a site could 
avoid liability merely by having purchased the site after 
chemical dumping had ceased, waste sites certainly would be 
sold, following the cessation of the dumping, to new owners 
who could avoid the liability otherwise required by 
CERCLA."56 Thus, current owners, regardless of the fact that 
they did not own the property at the time of disposal, are liable 
under CERCLA. 
Whether a person is an "operator" of a facility depends 
largely on the degree of control which the person had over the 
facility. In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials 
Co.,57 the court, using common law principles, found that de-
spite the fact that the defendant had "designed and built the 
plant, furnished toxic chemical, trained [plaintiffs] employees, 
and reserved a right to inspect ongoing operations" the defen-
dant was not an operator largely because it "had no control of 
the work at the [plaintiffs] plant, no right to choose employees, 
direct their activities, or set prices; it had at most a limited 
veto power" enabling it to stop sales if the product was not "up 
to snuff."58 
Similarly, in United States v. New Castle County,59 the 
court agreed with the state of Delaware that its regulation of a 
hazardous waste site did not make it an "operator" of the site 
for CERCLA purposes despite the fact that it granted permits 
to dump hazardous waste and required implementation of a 
groundwater monitoring program as part of its permit approval 
53. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985). See 
also United States v. Cauffman, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 2167 (C.D. Col. 1984). 
54. ld. 
55. ld. at 1043. 
56. ld. at 1045. 
57. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). 
58. ld. at 158. 
59. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989). 
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process.60 The court noted several nonexclusive factors which 
may, based upon the unique factual situation presented, be 
relevant in determining whether a person had "operator" status 
under CERCLA: 
The court should inquire ... into whether the person sought 
to be strapped with operator status controlled the finances of 
the facility; managed employees of the facility; managed the 
daily business operations of the facility; was responsible for 
the maintenance of environmental control at the facility; and 
conferred or received any commercial or economic benefit from 
the facility, other than the payment or receipt oftaxes.61 
B. Past Owners or Sellers 
CERCLA section 107(a)(2) imposes liability for the costs 
associated with a hazardous waste cleanup upon "any person 
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned 
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances 
were disposed of."62 When applied to typical past owners, the 
interpretation of this section is essentially clear and unambigu-
ous: Typical owners or operators of facilities at the time of 
disposal are liable. 63 But, as is discussed in the following sec-
tions, when applied to not so typical "owners or operators" such 
as successor corporations, lenders, officers, and majority share-
holders, this section as well as section 107(a)(l) becomes much 
more controversial. 
A past owner or operator may not use the doctrine of cave-
at emptor as a defense to CERCLA liability, nor may he use it 
as a defense to a current owner's contribution action against 
him.64 Similarly, clauses in real estate contracts reciting that 
the intended buyer has inspected the property and agrees to 
purchase the property "as is" and "in its present condition sub-
ject to reasonable use" are ineffective as a defense to the 
buyer's contribution action against a past owner.65 However, 
60. !d. at 864-69. 
61. !d. at 869. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). 
63. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chern. Co., 840 F.2d 691 (9th 
Cir. 1988); Wiegmann & Rose Intern. Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
64. Smith Land Improvement Corp. v Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89-90 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
65. See Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. 
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although past owners may not indemnify themselves against a 
governmental CERCLA liability claim, a clear and unambigu-
ous agreement between a past owner and buyer indemnifying 
the past owner for any CERCLA liability will be effective as to 
the parties.66 Thus, although a past owner cannot avoid joint, 
several, and strict CERCLA liability, he may recover from the 
buyer in a 113(£) contribution action, if the purchase agreement 
clearly indemnified him. Of course, recovery to such a past 
owner against a buyer is contingent upon the financial viability 
of the buyer at the time of the contribution action. 
Courts have construed section 107(a)(2) broadly. In United 
States v. Sharon Steel Corp.,61 the court found that even a dis-
solved corporation which was a past owner of a hazardous 
waste site at the time of disposal could, despite state law pro-
viding that dissolved corporations had no capacity to be sued, 
be held liable for response costs incurred to cleanup the site 
where the corporation's assets had not yet been fully distribut-
ed to shareholders. The court pointed out that to hold other-
wise would allow a corporation to dissolve in order to take 
away its capacity to be sued; thus, "any corporation could es-
cape CERCLA liability simply by dissolving before the govern-
ment brought suit, perhaps to incorporate again after someone 
else had paid to clean up its hazardous waste."68 
Even where a past owner did nothing to dispose of hazard-
ous materials while he owned the property, courts may find a 
way to impose CERCLA liability. In Westwood Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.,69 the court noted 
that an innocent intervening owner may be exposed to 
CERCLA liability where it, as intervening owner, obtains actu-
al knowledge of a release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances and then transfers ownership of the property to 
another person without disclosing that knowledge. 70 
Courts may even, given the proper facts, find room to ex-
pand the meaning of "disposed of' in CERCLA section 107(a)(2) 
to allow it to find a seemingly innocent seller liable.71 In 
Cal. 1990); International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1988). 
67. 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
68. ld. at 1497-98 (refusing to follow Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Ter-
minal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
69. 767 F. Supp. 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
70. !d. at 462-63. 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988) defines "disposal" as 
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Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,72 the 
court held that a real estate developer who had merely "filled 
in and graded creosote pools" left by its predecessor owner had 
disposed of toxins and thus could be held liable as a past owner 
under CERCLA section 107(aX2). 73 Broadly construing the 
definition of "disposal" in CERCLA section 103(3), the court 
found that the "definition of disposal does not limit disposal to 
a one-time occurrence-the.re may be other disposals when 
hazardous materials are moved, dispersed, or released during 
landfill excavations and fillings."74 Of course the ramifications 
of this holding can be preposterous. Could one be held liable as 
a past owner for merely having dug a post-hole in his back 
yard? Although it seems inconceivable that a court could ever 
hold so, under a literal reading of Tanglewood such a past 
owner could be liable. 
Given the exposure that a past owner has to potential 
CERCLA liability, and given such ludicrous holdings as 
Tanglewood's, a potential seller, even if it did nothing to place 
hazardous wastes on the property, should be cautious when 
considering the sale of even remotely possibly contaminated 
property. On first blush, one might think that CERCLA could 
only enhance a landowner's desire to sell possibly contaminated 
property and thereby at least realize some return, while also 
possibly roping in another PRP to share in any liability for 
cleanup that subsequently might be imposed. However, even if 
possible, selling may not necessarily be to the property owner's 
advantage. 
If a potentially hazardous substance exists on the property 
and the possibility of a release, the owner might well decide to 
hold onto the property and carefully manage it to avoid a re-
lease, rather than risk a new owner's untaking activity that 
might cause a release and attract enforcement attention. 
Also, a responsible property owner might well decide that 
it would be cheaper in the long run to hold contaminated prop-
erty and voluntarily clean it up at a manageable cost, rather 
than risk an EPA enforcement action at twice the price after 
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid 
waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or 
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be 
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 
72. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988). 
73. !d. at 1571-73. 
74. !d. at 1573. 
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the property is beyond its control. 75 
C. Lenders and the Security Interest Exemption 
The so-called "security interest exemption" spelled out in 
CERCLA section 101(20)(A) purports to exempt from liability 
one "who, without participating in the management of a ... 
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his 
security interest in the facility;" however, many secured lenders 
seemingly fitting this exemption have been held to be "owners 
or operators" of a facility on which hazardous wastes have been 
released, and thus have become exposed to millions in 
CERCLA liability. These cases can be divided into two groups: 
those finding that the secured lender became an "operator" of 
the facility (without foreclosing on the property) due the extent 
of its control; and those finding that the secured lender became 
an "owner" of the facility upon foreclosure and purchase 
through a sheriffs sale. These decisions have prompted heated 
opposition from the lending industry, academia,76 and conse-
quently from members of Congress. 77 
1. ((Owner" Lenders 
"There is a divergence in case law as to whether the securi-
ty interest exemption is applicable when a secured creditor 
purchases its security interest at a foreclosure sale.'m Howev-
er, the recent trend among courts, of course, is to limit the 
security interest exemption as much as possible to assure ac-
cess to as many deep pockets as possible. 
a. United States v. Mirabile.79 In United States v Mira-
75. JACKSON B. BA'M'LE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW VOL 2A 244-45 (1989). 
76. See, e.g., Ufford, supra note 1, at 17; Bass, supra note 5, at 898-903. 
77. S&L Bailout Faces a Costly New Complication in U.S. Hazardous-Waste 
Cleanup Requirement, WALL ST. J., Mar 22, 1990 at A16. For some proposed 
regulations which would limit lender liability, see 56 Fed. Reg. 28808 (1991) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24, 1991). This proposal defines the 
terms "indicia of ownership," "primarily to protect a security interest," and "par-
ticipation in management" and would add substantial clarity to this provision as 
well as treat lenders more fairly. 
78. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing United States v. Mirabile 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. Sept 4, 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 
F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986)). 
79. 15 ENVTL L. REP. (Envtl L. lnst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
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bile,80 this issue was first raised and was summarily dealt 
with by the court in the secured lender's favor. In that case 
American Bank & Trust (ABT), one of the secured lenders, 
foreclosed on .and bought property where a hazardous waste 
site was located and sold the property to the Mirabiles four 
months later. The court dismissed the Mirabiles' argument that 
when the secured party acquired the property through foreclo-
sure it no longer was merely a secured party holding indicia of 
ownership but rather became an "owner" subject to liability 
under CERCLA section 107(a). The court held that the actions 
of ABT in foreclosing on the property "were plainly undertaken 
in an effort to protect its security interest in the property" 
where the only actions taken by the secured party following 
foreclosure were to secure the property against vandalism, in-
quire into the cost of properly disposing of various drums on 
the property, and visit the property several times to show it to 
prospective purchasers.81 Since the secured party, after fore-
closing, "made no effort to continue . . . operations," it was 
merely holding indicia of ownership primarily to protect its 
security interest in the property.82 This makes good sense 
since a secured lender's purchase through a foreclosure sale is 
the natural consequence of the protection of a security interest. 
If a secured lender cannot foreclose and purchase the property 
at the sheriffs sale without exposing itself to CERCLA liability, 
its security interest would have little or no value since the 
practical value of any security interest in real property is based 
on the right to foreclose. 
The Mirabile court felt that Congress' intent was clear. 
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lend-
ing institutions would enhance the government's chances of 
recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact that owners and 
operators of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, 
defunct, or otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that the 
imposition of such liability would help to ensure more respon-
sible management of such sites. The consideration of such 
policy matters, and the decision as the imposition of such 
liability, however, lies with Congress. In enacting CERCLA 
Congress singled out secured creditors for protection from lia-
bility under certain circumstances. Because I believe ABT has 
80. 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20994. 
81. ld. 
82. ld. 
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brought itself within that protection, ABT is entitled to the 
entry of summary judgment in its favor. 83 
Unfortunately, subsequent courts facing this issue did not feel 
that Congress' intent was so clear. 
b. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.84 In 
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,85 the court held 
that when a secured party forecloses on property, purchases it 
through a foreclosure sale, and holds the property for an ex-
tended period, it becomes an "owner" of that property under 
CERCLA section 107(a) and loses the security interest exemp-
tion. 86 In that case, Maryland Bank & Trust foreclosed on the 
property, purchased it at the sheriffs sale, and then held title 
for four years when the EPA sued for recovery costs.87 Accord-
ing to the court, Congress intended the section 101(20)(A) ex-
emption to exclude mortgagees in common law states where it 
actually holds title to the property during the life of the mort-
gage.88 However, "[t]he exclusion does not apply to former 
mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the proper-
ty at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here, the former 
mortgagee has held title for nearly four years and a full year 
before the EPA clean-up."89 However, the court explicitly re-
fused to consider whether "a secured party which purchased 
the property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly resold it 
would be precluded from asserting the section 101(20)(A) ex-
emption. "90 
The court argued that if mortgagees like Maryland Bank & 
Trust were not liable, 
the federal government alone would shoulder the cost of 
cleaning up the site, while the former mortgagee-turned-own-
er would benefit from the clean-up by the increased value of 
the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the mortgag-
ee could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective 
83. Id. 
84. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
85. ld. 
86. Id. at 579. 
87. ld. at 575. The court distinguished its holding from the Mirabile holding by 
pointing out that in that case ABT had promptly assigned the property but "to the 
extent that the opinion suggests a rule of broader application . . . respectfully 
disagrees" with the Mirabile court. Id. at 580. 
88. ld. at 579. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 579 n.5. 
365] REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND CERCLA 383 
purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, 
and would shy away from the sale. Yet, once the property has 
been cleared at the taxpayers' expense and becomes market-
able, the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a position to 
sell the site at a profit. 
In essence, the defendant's position would convert 
CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions, 
protecting them against possible losses due to the security of 
loans with polluted properties. Mortgagees, however, already 
have the means to protect themselves, by making prudent 
loans [and by not foreclosing or bidding at a foreclosure sale]. 
Financial institutions are in a position to investigate and 
discover potential problems in their secured properties. For 
many lending institutions, such research is routine. CERCLA 
will not absolve them from responsibility for their mistakes of 
judgment.91 
Commentators argue that the Maryland decision ignores 
commercial realities and reflects an "obvious lack of concern for 
secured lenders' financial risk . . . . [since under Maryland 
Bank & Trust] secured creditors must in fact abandon their 
collateral or face enormous risk".92 Other commentators point 
out that the court failed to consider the broad societal costs 
which this decision may impose.93 Under Maryland Bank & 
Trust, lenders are forced to take additional precautions when 
entering into new loans; and as to already existing loans, they 
are forced to swallow large losses on contaminated property on 
which it holds a security interest by either abandoning the 
property or by foreclosing and facing potential CERCLA liabili-
ty as an "owner" of the property. All this will cause the cost of 
capital to rise; at least some portion of this increase will be 
passed on to all borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, 
thus causing the demand for capital to decline, resulting in 
stunted economic growth. 94 
c. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co.95 In 
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co. ,96 the court took the 
Maryland Bank & Trust decision a step further in apparently 
91. ld. at 580. 
92. See Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 17. 
93. Bass, supra note 5, at 899-903. 
94. ld. at 899-900. 
95. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
96. ld. 
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deciding what the Maryland court refused to decide. 97 In 
Guidice a foreclosing bank held title to a waste site for eight 
months before reselling it. 98 Although the court found that the 
bank's actions "prior to its purchase of the ... [p]roperty at the 
fureclosure sale were prudent measures undertaken to protect 
its security interest in the property,"99 the court found that 
once the bank foreclosed, the security interest exemption was 
no longer available to it for the period that it was the record 
owner. 100 ''When a lender is the successful purchaser at a 
foreclosure sale, the lender should be liable to the same extent 
as any other bidder at the sale would have been."101 "[A]n ex-
emption for landowning lenders would create a special class of 
otherwise liable landowners" which is contrary to Congress' in-
tent.102 
This decision "alarmed already skittish lenders even fur-
ther.'n03 It seems clear that this decision and its predecessors 
are likely to "have a chilling effect on credit,"104 thus causing 
a detrimental ripple effect on society. 
d. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 105 In the most recent deci-
sion dealing with the security interest exemption, the Ninth 
Circuit seemed to indicate that a secured creditor, by foreclos-
ing and becoming a record title holder, does not necessarily 
become an "owner" for CERCLA purposes if it holds title pri-
marily to protect its security interest. In In re Bergsoe Metal 
Corp., 106 the court, interpreting the plain language of 
CERCLA section 101(20)(A), held that the Port of St. Helens 
was not a CERCIA owner merely because it held title to the rontaminat-
ed property. 107 
That the Port holds paper title to the [site] does not, alone, 
make it an owner of the facility for purposes of CERCLA; 
under the security interest exception, the court must deter-
mine why the Port holds such indicia of ownership. Here, 
97. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
98. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 557. 
99. !d. at 562. 
100. !d. at 563. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. 
103. S&L Bailout Faces a Costly New Complication in U.S. Hazardous-Waste 
Cleanup Requirement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1990, at A16. 
104. !d. 
105. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). 
106. !d. 
107. !d. at 671. 
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there is no doubt that the Port has the deed in the [site] pri-
marily to ensure that [the debtor] would meet its obliga-
tions.108 
Although the Port had never foreclosed to obtain paper 
title, essentially the same argument can be used for a secured 
creditor who does become a title holder after foreclosing on con-
taminated property. The fact that a secured party holds title 
due to foreclosure should not, alone, make it a CERCLA "own-
er". The issue should be whether the secured creditor is holding 
indicia of ownership to merely assure that its loan will be paid, 
or whether it is holding indicia of ownership for some addition-
al purpose, such as to be involved in the management of the 
property, or for investment purposes. If the secured party holds 
the property for longer than is necessary to resell it and receive 
the equivalent of payment on its loan, or does more than is 
absolutely necessary to protect the property from damage, then 
it is probably doing more than holding indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect its security interest. If, however, immedi-
ately after foreclosure the secured party/title holder diligently 
attempts to resell the property, and only takes steps necessary 
to sell the property and protect it against damage, such as 
insuring it and protecting it against vandalism, it is merely 
holding indicia of ownership to protect its security interest and 
thus should not be liable as an "owner" under CERCLA section 
107(a).109 Indeed, Mirabile and even Maryland Bank & Trust 
make sense under this analysis. In Maryland Bank & Trust 
since the secured party held title for four years, the court rea-
sonably concluded that it was doing more than primarily pro-
tecting its security interest in property. 
e. Which argument makes nwre sense? It is difficult to 
dispute the Maryland Bank & Trust and Guidice courts' con-
clusions that to allow a secured creditor to foreclose on proper-
ty without becoming exposed to CERCLA liability as "owners" 
would essentially allow the mortgagee-turned-owner to reap a 
windfall from a governmental cleanup of land on which it had 
foreclosed. It could acquire the property cheaply at the fore-
closure sale since all other potential buyers would, by buying, 
expose themselves to CERCLA liability as a present owner, 
108. !d. 
109. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst) 20994, 
20996 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
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hold the property while the government cleans it up, and then 
sell the now clean property at a substantially higher price. 110 
It seems to this author, however, that the secured creditor in 
such a case is not so much reaping a windfall as it is avoiding 
a loss. Upon a post-cleanup sale, a secured creditor would re-
cover only its loan principal. Any remainder in the sale price 
would most likely go to the government to compensate for its 
cleanup costs under a Superfund lien. If a secured lender can-
not foreclose on contaminated property and resell it without 
exposing itself to CERCLA liability, it is essentially faced with 
the unpleasant choice of swallowing the loss either by abandon-
ing the property altogether or foreclosing and subjecting itself 
to CERCLA liability potentially far greater than the value of 
the property. If liability is not imposed on a secured lender due 
to its foreclosure of contaminated property, it is not reaping a 
windfall at all, but it is merely avoiding a loss. The ultimate 
issue, then, is whether secured lenders or the government 
should bear the cost of hazardous waste cleanup. Whether the 
government or lenders pay, the cost will be passed on to soci-
ety, either by lenders in the form of higher interest rates, or by 
the government in the form of higher taxes. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to address whether the 
costs of hazardous waste cleanup are better imposed on society 
through higher interest rates or through higher taxes, nor 
should that be the purpose of courts addressing this issue. A 
court should interpret statutes according to their plain mean-
ing if possible. It is this author's opinion that the security in-
terest exemption's meaning is plain. If a secured party holds 
indicia of ownership (whether through foreclosure or not) pri-
marily to protect its security interest (i.e., insures and pays 
taxes on the property, protects it from vandalism, and diligent-
ly tries to resell it), then it is not an "owner or operator" under 
CERCLA section 107(a), and is thus not liable for the costs 
associated with a hazardous waste facility cleanup. 
2. "Operator" Lenders 
Until recently, "case law suggest[ed] that, prior to foreclo-
sure, a mortgagee is exempt from CERCLA liability under [the 
110. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 623 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. 
Md. 1986); Guidice v. BFJ Electroplating & Mfg. Co, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 
(W.D. Pa. 1989). 
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secured party exemption] so long as the mortgagee did not 
participate in the managerial and operational aspects of the fa-
cility."m However, the dicta in one opinion could substantial-
ly narrow the availability of this exemption to secured parties; 
the court in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 112 said that 
a secured creditor can expose itself to CERCLA liability as an 
"operator" of a facility merely "by participating in the financial 
management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to 
influence the [debtor's] treatment of hazardous waste .... [A] 
secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the man-
agement of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the infer-
ence that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it 
so chose."113 
a. United States v. Mirabile. 114 In Mirabile the court 
held that the security interest exemption protected the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) from CERCLA liability. 115 
The Mirabiles argued that, although the SBA was never in-
volved in the operation of the facility, since the "loan 
agreement ... apparently contemplated some degree of in-
volvement which could be characterized as participation in day-
to-day management" the SBA did not qualify for the security 
interest exemption. 116 The court did not agree that "participa-
tion in purely financial aspects of operation, of the sort which 
occurred here, is sufficient to bring a lender within the scope of 
CERCLA liability."117 
However, the court refused to grant summary judgment to 
another secured creditor, Mellon Bank, due to its "participation 
[and] oversight of the company."118 The court held that 
Mellon's degree of involvement in the company's day-to-day 
operations, such as "monitoring the cash collateral accounts, 
ensuring that receivables went to the proper account, ... es-
tablishing a reporting system between the company and the 
111. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992, 20995 
(E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 995, 960 (S.D. 
Ga. 1988); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1989)). 
112. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). 
113. United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
114. 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
115. !d. at 20997. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
118. !d. 
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bank," visiting the site often, demanding additional sales ef-
forts, and requiring manufacturing changes and reassignment 
of personnel was enough to preclude summary judgment in 
Mellon Bank's favor. 119 Thus, it was clear after Mirabile that 
so long as a creditor who had not foreclosed refrained from 
participating in the day-to-day operations of the facility, the 
security interest exemption protected it from CERCLA liability. 
b. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co. 120 In 
Guidice, the court held that a secured creditor's pre-foreclosure 
activities were "insufficient to void the security interest exemp-
tion of CERCLA."121 The secured creditor's pre-foreclosure ac-
tivities included the following: meeting with company officials 
to be informed of such things as the status of accounts, per-
sonnel changes, the presence of raw materials; assisting in loan 
applications; communicating with local officials to assist the 
debtor in wastewater discharge compliance; visiting the proper-
ty; meeting to consider the restructuring of the debtor's loans; 
and referring a potential lessee to the debtor. 122 The court 
found all of these pre-foreclosure actions to be "prudent mea-
sures undertaken to protect its security interest in the proper-
ty."123 The court also noted the policy reason for the exemp-
tion of secured creditors in the bank's position prior to foreclo-
sure: 
A goal of CERCLA is safe handling and disposal of hazardous 
waste. To encourage banks to monitor a debtor's use of securi-
ty property, a high liability threshold will enhance the dual 
purposes of protection of the banks' investments and promot-
ing CERCLA's policy goals. Conversely, a low liability stan-
dard would encourage a lender to terminate its association 
with a financially troubled debtor and expedite loan payments 
in an effort to recover the debts. 124 
119. Id. 
120. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.E. Pa. 1989). 
121. Id. at 562. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citing Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participa-
tion Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925 (1989); Note, The 
liability of Financial Institutions {or Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under 
CERCLA, 139 Wrs. L. REV. 139 (1988); Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: 
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 
(1987)). 
365] REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND CERCLA 389 
c. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 125 In Fleet 
Factors the 11th Circuit sent a shockwave through the lending 
industry when it said in dicta 126 that the secured interest ex-
emption will be waived where a secured creditor 
participat[es] in the financial management of a facility to a 
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's 
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the se-
cured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day oper-
ations of the facility in order to be liable . . . . [A] secured 
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management 
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference 
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so 
chose. 127 
The court argued that its decision would "encourage potential 
creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment sys-
tems and policies of potential debtors" and weigh any perceived 
risks into the loan agreement. 128 The decision, however, ig-
nores the millions of creditors who loaned money to businesses 
previous to this ruling. They certainly, because of this decision, 
"incur[red] a much greater risk than they bargained for."129 
d. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 130 The Ninth Circuit ap-
parently refused to restrict the availability of the security in-
terest exemption to the extent that the Fleet Factors court 
did. 131 The court, interpreting the words of the statute, held 
that "[i]t is clear from the statute that, whatever the precise 
125. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). 
126. See id. at 1559 n.13 (noting that a lender's capacity to influence a debtor's 
facility treatment will normally be "inferred from the extent of its involvement in 
the facility's fmancial management" but that here this analysis was unnecessary 
since the creditor actually had asserted control over the waste site). 
127. ld. at 1557-58 (emphasis added) (refusing to follow Mirabile, 15 ENVTL L. 
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985)). The court found the lower court's 
reasoning, which essentially found the secured party to be an "operator" because it 
actually had participated in the day-to-day operations of the facility, to be "too 
permissive towards secured creditors who are involved with toxic waste facilities. 
In order to achieve the 'overwhelmingly remedial' goal of the CERCLA statutory 
scheme, ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability for the 
costs incurred by the government in responding to the hazards at such facilities." 
ld. at 1557. 
128. ld. at 1558. 
129. ld. 
130. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). 
131. ld. at 672 ("[w]e leave for another day the establishment of a Ninth Circuit 
rule on this difficult issue"). 
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parameters of 'participation,' there must be some actual man-
agement of the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside 
the exception."132 Thus, although not disagreeing with Fleet 
Factors, the court refused to go quite as far. Since there was no 
management of the facility in Bergsoe, the court did not need to 
determine whether or to what degree mere participation in the 
financial management of a facility will indicate a capacity to 
influence the debtor's handling of hazardous waste. 133 The 
court did, however, note: "That a secured creditor reserves cer-
tain rights to protect its investment does not put it in a posi-
tion of management. What is critical is not what the [creditor] 
had, but what it did."134 Thus, it is clear from this decision 
that mere capacity, reserved in the loan agreements, to influ-
ence the debtor's handling of hazardous waste will not in and 
ofitselfvoid the security interest exemption. However, once the 
creditor does participate in the financial management, it is 
unclear, at least in the Ninth Circuit, to what extent it may go 
before it will become exposed to CERCLA liability. 
3. Limiting Potential Lender Liability In light of these cases, 
lenders must exercise extreme caution in entering into and 
handling loans with borrowers who have potential CERCLA 
liability (industrial, commercial, or farm property). Commenta-
tors urge a number of precautions which lending institutions 
should take. 135 
a. Before entering into a loan agreement consider the need 
to do an environmental audit. "A creditor should not enter into 
a loan or commence a foreclosure action where the principal 
security is industrial, commercial or farm property without 
evaluating the need for obtaining an environmental audit of 
the property."136 Although these are not guaranteed to detect 
all environmental problems, the likelihood that the "innocent 
landowner" defense will be available to a secured creditor is 
greatly enhanced by a pre-loan environmental audit.137 
132. ld. (emphasis in original). 
133. Id. 
134. ld. 
135. The following guidelines are recommended in Ufford, supra note 1, at 19. 
For additional detailed guidance in this minefield of potential liability, see Guide-
lines to Avoid or Limit CERCLA Liability, 21 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 614-15 (July 28, 
1989). 
136. 
137. 
Ufford, supra note 1, at 18. 
Considering few successful "innocent landowner" defenses, perhaps the likeli-
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b. Train loan officers to do environmental "due diligence" 
reviews. Loan officers should know how to identify potential 
hazardous waste, know of the harm that various hazardous 
wastes can cause, and know of the methods and costs involved 
in lawfully handling them. 138 They should be on the lookout 
for any potential warning signs of hazardous wastes. 139 
c. Determine whether the debtor's potential uses of and 
whether any past uses of the property will or have in any way 
involve(d) hazardous wastes. A creditor should determine 
whether the debtor will use hazardous materials or generate, 
store, or dispose of hazardous wastes on the property and 
whether any of the property has in the past been used by one 
who used hazardous materials or generated stored, or disposed 
of hazardous wastes on the property. 140 If any of the above 
signals hint of any hazardous waste problems, the lender 
should probably have its own environmental engineering con-
sultant conduct an environmental audit before proceeding with 
the transaction, should assure that the documents contain 
"appropriate contractual provisions shifting the risk to the 
borrower," and thoroughly consider the risks in proceeding 
with the transaction. 141 
d. Before foreclosing reevaluate the above considerations 
to determine whether an environmental audit may be warrant-
ed. As is discussed above, a secured creditor places itself at a 
substantial risk to potential CERCLA liability for amounts far 
greater than the value of the underlying property if it foreclos-
es on a site that is later discovered to be hazardous. Conse-
quently, it should carefully consider this risk before foreclos-
ing. 
e. Draft adequate loan documentation. Loan documents 
should represent and warrant that 1) the seller is and has 
been in compliance with all federal, state, and local environ-
mental laws and permit requirements; 2) there are no pending 
or potential environmental actions against the seller to the 
seller's best knowledge; 3) there are no past or current releas-
es of hazardous substances at the facility, as defined under 
hood that the secured lender will be unsuccessful at raising the "innocent landown-
er" defense will at least be diminished. 
138. ld. 
139. ld. Such as "soil or water discoloration, oozing liquids, discolored or unnatu-
ral vegetation, unexplained bare spots, chemical odors," etc. ld. 
140. ld. 
141. ld. 
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CERCLA and any other environmental law; 4) the seller is not 
aware of any condition at or concerning the facility that would 
give rise to an action or liability under any ordinance.142 
f. Conduct an insurance analysis. Lenders should ana-
lyze the borrower's, as well as its own insurance to determine 
whether CERCLA liability is covered, 143 and, if possible re-
quire the borrower to obtain it. It should be noted, however, 
that "for most businesses in the United States insurance 
against environmental liability is completely unavailable."144 
g. Avoid becoming a lender in control. As is discussed 
above, the security interest exemption is unavailable where 
the secured party participates in the management of the facili-
ty. The following creditor activities are unlikely to remove the 
creditor from the protection of the security interest exemption: 
(1) entering into a security agreement or mortgage; (2) filing 
mortgages or financing statements (UCC-1 forms), even for 
hazardous materials; (3) requiring a debtor to submit to the 
creditor detailed financial statements and annual cash flow 
projections; (4) auditing the books of a debtor; (5) monitoring 
cash collateral accounts; or (6) establishing a financial re-
porting system between the debtor and the creditor. 145 
The following activities by a secured creditor will likely 
expose it to CERCLA liability as one who participates in the 
management of the debtor to a degree indicating a capacity to 
influence its decisions concerning hazardous waste disposal: 
(1) taking over the management of the debtor; (2) obtaining 
the right to have a third party manage the affairs of the 
debtor; (3) installing an agent to take over the management 
of the debtor's business; (4) promising payments to other 
creditors on behalf of the debtor; or (5) foreclosing on and 
obtaining sheriff's deed to contaminated property that is held 
as security for a loan. 146 
142. ld. at 19. 
143. ld. 
144. Abraham, supra note 2, at 944. (remarking that "the demise of the envi-
ronmental liability market is a symptom of the high levels of legal uncertainty 
that are being created by the new environmental liability"). See also Percy L. 
Angelo & Lynn L. Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for Environmental 
Damage and its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REV. 101, 115 (1985). 
145. Ufford, supra note 1, at 19. (quoting Burcat, Environmental Liability of 
Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING 
L.J. 509, 537 (1986)). 
146. ld. (quoting Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on 
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4. Proposed Regulations 
Maryland Bank & Trust, Guidice, and Fleet Factors have 
caused outrage throughout the commercial lending industry, 
prompting members of Congress to propose guidelines clari-
fying and broadening current availability of the security inter-
est exemption. 147 It is likely that some version of these pro-
posals will soon be enacted. If so, the availability of the securi-
ty interest exemption would be significantly broadened by al-
lowing creditors to purchase property through a foreclosure sale 
without risking CERCLA liability so long as the security holder 
"temporarily acquires" the property for subsequent disposition 
and such an act is a "necessary incident[] to protection of the 
security interest."148 This regulation also would more clearly 
define what actions constitute participation in management 
sufficient to invalidate availability of the security interest ex-
emption. 149 Needless to say, such legislation would greatly 
enhance a lender's willingness to enter into loan agreements at 
reasonable rates with borrowers whose activities may risk 
hazardous waste dangers. It seems clear to me that these new 
proposals are in line with the original purpose of the security 
interest exemption. The courts, in their fervor to interpret 
CERCLA as broadly as possible and to reach as many deep 
pockets as possible, stretched the plain meaning of the security 
interest exemption to a point where it provided very little pro-
tection, if any, to secured creditors. The proposed legislation 
would bring courts back to reality. 
D. Corporate Officer and Majority Shareholders 
"By now, a substantial line of decisions has established 
that corporate officers and directors will themselves be 'owners' 
and 'operators' under section 107(a)(l) and (2) if they are ac-
tively involved in the day-to-day management of a liable corpo-
ration."150 For example, in United States v. Carolina Transform-
Banks, Creditors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509, 537 (1986)). 
147. S&L Bailout Faces a Costly New Complication in U.S. Hazardous-Waste 
Cleanup Requirement, WALL ST. J. Mar. 22, 1990, at A16. For an example of such 
proposed regulations, see 56 Fed. Reg. 28808 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 
300) (proposed June 24, 1991). 
148. 56 Fed. Reg. at 28808. 
149. Id. at 28809. 
150. Battle, supra note 75, at 253 (citing United States v. Conservation Chern. 
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er, Inc., 151 the court found that a corporation's 100 percent 
shareholder and former president who personally supervised 
day-to-day operations at the site, was "jointly and severally 
liable under CERCLA as an owner and operator."152 The 
court enumerated several factors which have been established 
to determine whether an officer should be liable under 
CERCLA: 
[S]izeable stock ownership in the corporation, active partic-
ipation in the management of the corporation, presence at 
and supervision of the operation of the facility, founded the 
company, capacity and general responsibility to control the 
disposal of hazardous waste at the facility, power to direct 
negotiations concerning the disposal of hazardous wastes .... 
The dominant consideration appears to be significant partici-
pation in the running of the company, especially as it relates 
to waste disposal. 153 
A number of cases hold similarly. 154 
E. Lessors 
Under the same standard that a current or past owner or 
operator may be held liable under CERCLA section 107(a)(l) 
and (2), a lessor of the property may be liable. For example, in 
United States u. Monsanto Co./55 the court held that a land-
owner who entered into a lease with a company which stored 
hazardous waste on the land were liable as "owners" under 
section 107(a) and that the third party exemption of section 
107(b)(3) did not protect them since they, through the lease, 
were in a contractual relationship with the party responsible 
for the hazardous wastes and they "presented no evidence that 
they took any precautionary action against the foreseeable 
conduct of' that party. 156 "In our view, the statute does not 
sanction such willful or negligent blindness on the part of ab-
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 186-190 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
151. 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 
152. ld. at 1036-37. 
153. ld. 
154. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 628 F. 
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 
1983). See also Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 144, at 110. 
155. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). 
156. ld. at 168-69. 
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sentee owners."157 
F. Parent Corporations 
If a parent corporation is found to be participating in the 
management of a subsidiary to a substantial degree, a court is 
likely to hold it liable under CERCLA as an "owner or opera-
tor." For example, in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co./58 the court 
held that a parent corporation's activities with respect to the 
subsidiary were sufficient to make it an "owner or operator" 
under CERCLA section 107(a) where the parent was intimately 
familiar with hazardous waste disposal and releases of the 
subsidiary facility, had capacity to control such disposal and 
releases, and had capacity, if not totally reserved authority, to 
make decisions and implement actions and mechanisms to 
prevent and abate damage caused by disposal and releases of 
hazardous wastes.159 However, "'normal' activities of a parent 
with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically warrant 
finding the parent an owner or operator."160 
G. Successor Corporations 
"[T]he successor corporation in a merger or consolidation 
assumes the potential environmental liabilities of its predeces-
sors."161 However, an asset purchase does not normally result 
in liability for the successor corporation.162 In Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp./63 the court found that 
successor CERCLA liability could be imposed on a corporation 
which had either merged or consolidated with a company which 
had "created a large waste pile in the course of manufacturing 
asbestos products."164 The court pointed out that, where the 
choice is between placing the burden for hazardous waste 
157. !d. at 169. 
158. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986). 
159. !d. at 672. See also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989) (parent corporation can be liable under CERCLA if it has substantial 
financial ownership of the subsidiary, control over management, is active in man-
agement, familiar with hazardous waste disposal at the subsidiary's facility, had 
capacity to control disposal, and benefitted from subsidiary's waste disposal practic-
es). 
160. !d. 
161. 
162. 
163. 
164. 
Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 144, at 109. 
!d. 
851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988). 
!d. at 88. 
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cleanup on taxpayers or on successor corporations, "the succes-
sor should bear the cost."165 
H. Trustees and Executors 
Although one who inherits a facility plagued with potential 
hazardous waste liability is expressly excluded from CERCLA 
liability/66 "if an executor or trustee undertakes to operate a 
site containing hazardous materials, the executor may be ex-
posed to CERCLA liability as an 'operator,' 'generator,' or 
'transporter' of hazardous substances."167 Where a "trustee 
holds legal title to the trust assets .... the trustee may be ex-
posed to direct responsibility for hazardous waste contamina-
tion liability as the 'owner' of the facility."168 
I. Third Party and Innocent Landowner Defenses 
1. Third Party Defense 
CERCLA section 107(b) provides for a defense to CERCLA 
liability if the defendant can show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the release or threatened release was caused 
solely by "an act or omission of a third party other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or 
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, 
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... , if the 
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous sub-
stance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics 
of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable 
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences 
that could foreseeably result from such acts or omis-
sions .... "169 This is commonly referred to as the third party 
defense. Of course its applicability is extremely limited since it 
requires that there be no contractual relationship between the 
polluting third party and the defendant. In these situations, 
165. ld. at 92. 
166. 42 u.s.c. § 9607 (1988). 
167. Ufford, supra note 1, at 20. 
168. !d. (recommending risk management strategies which should be considered 
by fiduciaries). See also United States v. Burns, No C-88-94-L (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 
1988) (imposing personal CERCLA liability on trustee and sole beneficiary of trust 
for property which had been contaminated before being placed in the trust). 
169. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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there almost always is a contractual relationship. 
A survey of the cases wherein this defense is raised reveals 
how rarely it will be allowed. For example, in United States v. 
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc./70 the court denied 
the third-party defense to the owner of the property since a 
contractual relationship existed with the responsible third 
party through a lease agreement between the defendant and 
the third party. 171 
However, it has been held that where the contractual rela-
tionship between the third-party polluter and the defendant is 
dissolved prior to the polluter's omissions, use of the third-
party defense is not precluded. 172 One court recently held 
that a predecessor's sale of contaminated property to its pres-
ent owner did not establish a "contractual relationship" be-
tween the parties that would defeat the predecessor's use of the 
third-party defense provided that the acts causing the release 
did not occur "in connection with" the deed between the par-
ties.173 
2. Innocent Landowner Defense 
The innocent landowner defense is a subset of the third 
party defense. In 1986 the SARA amendments added a section 
which defined the previously undefined term "contractual rela-
tionship" to provide that no contractual relationship exists 
where "the real property on which the facility concerned is 
located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or 
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility," 
and the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence 
that "[a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the defen-
dant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazard-
ous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened 
170. 653 F. Supp. 984, (D.S.C. 1984). 
171. !d. at 993. See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048-
49 (2d Cir. 1985) (real estate developer not entitled to third-party defense because 
at the time of acquisition the developer knew of hazardous waste storage at the 
site and did not take the requisite precautions against the third party's foreseeable 
acts or omissions); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 ENVTL L. REP. (Envtl L. Inst) 
20616 (D.N.M. 1984) (third-party defense not available due to lease between 
defendant and third-party polluter via lease agreement). 
172. Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 743 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
173. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 767 F. 
Supp. 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility."174 A defen-
dant can be shown to have no reason to know of the hazardous 
substances if he undertook, "at the time of acquisition, all ap-
propriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the 
property consistent with good commercial or customary practice 
in an effort to minimize liability" considering such factors as 
any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the 
defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value 
of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or rea-
sonably ascertainable information about the property, the 
obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamina-
tion at the property, and the ability to detect such contamina-
tion by appropriate inspection. 175 
Successfully establishing this defense is also extremely difficult 
since it is difficult to show that "all appropriate inquiry" was 
made. 176 
Cases where this defense is successful are extremely 
rare. 177 The cases and commentary, do, however, clearly indi-
cate that the most critical aspect of this defense is establishing 
that, prior to . purchase, the defendant made "all appropriate 
inquiry" into the possibility that hazardous wastes may exist 
on the property.178 Thus, prospective purchasers of any real 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). 
175. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988). 
176. Ufford, supra note 1, at 16. 
177. My research reveals only two successful cases: International Clinical Labora-
tories Inc. v. Stevens, et. al., 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,560 (E.D.N.Y. 
1990) (Current owner had conducted inspection of property, incurred great expense 
in performing environmental test work and analysis, and purchase price did not 
reflect contamination) and United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. 
Supp 1341 (D. Idaho 1989) (current owners who received ownership of the contami· 
nated property through gift from their father, the founder of the corporation, suc-
cessfully asserted innocent landowner defense where the defendants had no knowl-
edge or reason to know of hazardous waste, had no specialized knowledge or 
experience concerning hazardous wastes, were not involved in operations of facility, 
and due to the fact that private transactions are given more leniency than com-
mercial transactions; this transaction was more like an inheritance, for which there 
is no CERCLA liability. Although the defendants had conducted no inquiry prior to 
purchase, the court found that "no inquiry" under these circumstances reasonable. 
Thus, no inquiry under these circumstances was "all appropriate inquiry"). See also 
United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (issues of fact existed 
precluding summary judgment against defendant on issue of availability of innocent 
landowner defense; issue existed as to whether current owners' failure to inspect 
site or inquire into past uses was inconsistent with good commercial practices). 
178. For guidance on what constitutes "all appropriate inquiry," see MoRTGAGE 
BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDS: A REAL ESTATE 
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estate, if there is any reason from which the existence of haz-
ardous wastes may be inferred/79 must have an environmen-
tal engineering consultant conduct an environmental assess-
ment of the property. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CERCLA liability issues affect almost every player in every 
real estate transactions. These players and their counsel must 
be well aware of this potential liability and ways in which it 
may be avoided or limited. Badly needed legislation may soon 
be enacted which will greatly clarify some aspects of this 
minefield of liability. However, until such legislation is enacted 
and it is clear how it will be applied, buyers, sellers, lenders, 
lessors and lessees, corporate successors, corporate officers and 
majority shareholders, and trustees must exercise extreme 
caution when entering into nearly any real estate transactions. 
Jeffrey M. Moss 
LENDERS VIEW (1988); H.R. 2787, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
179. Prospective buyers should conduct a title search to discover any past uses 
of the property which may have involved the production, storage, or disposal of 
hazardous materials. 
